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ABSTRACT 
In response to accounting failures of unprecedented proportions (e.g., Enron, 
WorldCom, etc.), in 2002 Congress passed and President Bush signed into law one of the 
most sweeping accounting reform bills since the Great Depression of the 1930s: the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX). SOX was intended to restore the public’s confidence in corporate reporting 
(Leone, 2003a).  To achieve this end, the bill contained numerous provisions aimed at 
improving corporate governance, financial disclosure and audits of published financial 
statements.  While the provisions of the law affect multiple constituencies, perhaps no parties 
are more directly affected than managers of public companies, boards of directors of those 
public companies, and their external auditors. 
As implementation of SOX has gone forward, each of these three groups has encountered 
ethical dilemmas associated not only with certain provisions of the legislation, but also with 
the SEC rules designed to put into action those provisions. The purpose of this paper is to 
highlight some of the unintended ethical consequences associated with SOX. One potential 
unintended ethical consequence of SOX is the possibility that it is contributing to an exodus 
of qualified CFOs and/or discouraging potential CFOs. As a result, SOX may be creating a 
shortage of qualified CFOs and, unwittingly encouraging less qualified individuals to seek out 
positions as CFOs, coupled with contributing to management inappropriately spending 
shareholders’ money (e.g., for insurance coverage for board of directors members, for 
consultants to advise the “experts” on the board, etc.). Additionally, the new act may be 
creating a shortage of qualified directors and, unwittingly encouraging less qualified 
individuals to seek out director positions.  
Practitioners’ Perceptions of the Incidence and Materiality 
of Potential Financial Statement Misrepresentation 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Financial statement misrepresentation has become the most costly area of financial 
statement fraud according to KPMG’s 2003 fraud survey (KPMG, 2003). The number and 
prominence of recent audit failures in cases involving misrepresentation of financial 
statements has led to a new and refocused emphasis on the auditor’s responsibility for 
detecting fraud. Indeed, recent changes in auditing standards on fraud detection, coupled with 
the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), have transformed the nature of the 
relationship between company management and the external auditors. While auditors once 
considered their client’s management “innocent until proven guilty,” this presumption has 
shifted to skepticism about client management’s innocence (Katz, 2003).   
What is unclear, however, is whether the external regulatory changes that shape 
practitioners’ presumption of management’s (lack of) innocence affect practitioners’ 
perception of the existence and magnitude of financial statement misrepresentation. Prior 
research finds an association between contextual factors and auditors’ perception of ethical 
issues such as financial statement misrepresentation
1
, particularly when the magnitude (i.e., 
“intensity”) of the issue increases (e.g., Ketchand, et al. 1999; Shafer, et al. 1999, 2001). In 
this paper, we use data from a survey of practitioners to attempt to shed some light on 
auditors’ perceptions about the causes of financial statement misrepresentation in the post-
SOX era as well as the expected materiality of such misstatements. 
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 See Jones, et al. 2003 for a review of the auditor ethics literature. 
 
The findings of this study are intended to establish benchmarks for the current state of 
auditors’ perception of the causes and materiality of financial statement misrepresentation in 
the post-SOX era. By doing so, our work will expand pre-SOX era research investigating the 
association between materiality and auditors’ perception of ethical issues such as financial 
statement misrepresentation (see, e.g., Ketchand, et al., 1999; Shafer, et al., 1999, 2001). In 
addition, because SAS No. 99 (AICPA, 2003a) requires auditors to hold a “brainstorming 
session” to discuss the likelihood of fraud on their audits, our findings can assist auditors in 
public practice by serving as a starting point for their brainstorming meetings.  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Auditors’ ethical perception and changes in the auditing environment 
Ethical perception is the ability of an individual to perceive that an issue (e.g., 
financial statement misstatement) has an ethical component.
2
 Research has shown that various 
individual factors (e.g., general demographic characteristics, ethical development, personal 
values, character, and training and experience) as well as contextual factors (e.g., the 
immediate job context, the broader external context, and issue-specific factors) associate with 
auditors’ ethical perception (see Jones, et al., 2003 for a recent review of the literature). Of 
particular interest to this study, several contextual factors particular to the auditing 
environment, including severe consequences (Karcher, 1996) and high-risk factors (Shaub 
and Lawrence, 1996), associate with a heightened ethical perception. 
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Some studies in prior research use different terms for “ethical perception,” including: “identification of an 
ethical dilemma” (e.g., Jones, et al., 2003); “ethical sensitivity” (e.g., Shaub, 1989); and “ethical awareness” 
(e.g., Cohen, et al, 2001). Regardless of the term used, all of the studies investigate the ability of an individual to 
perceive that an issue that has an ethical component. Accordingly, we have chosen to use the term “ethical 
perception” in our manuscript.  
Over nearly two decades, changes in the audit environment have been implemented to 
heighten auditors’ skepticism about their clients and, presumably, their sensitivity to the 
possibility of financial statement misrepresentation. Indeed, prior to the adoption of the 
Expectation Gap standards in the late 1980’s the audit environment generally operated under 
the assumption that the client was ethical.  However, with the adoption of SAS No. 53, The 
Auditor’s Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities, in 1988 (AICPA, 
1988), there was a subtle shift in attitude in that auditors were, post SAS No. 53, to assume 
the client was ethical only if there was no evidence to the contrary.   
 This shift was further accentuated by the adoption of SAS No. 82, Consideration of 
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit in 1997 (AICPA, 1997), which was prompted by the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.  SAS No. 82 required the auditor to 
specifically assess the risk of material misstatement at the beginning of the audit.  In addition, 
the auditor was required to adopt a neutral stance with respect to the integrity of management.  
That is, “the auditor neither assumes that management is dishonest nor assumes unquestioned 
honesty” (AICPA, 1997, Appendix B, Paragraph 9). 
 The adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 and the increased scrutiny of the 
profession that accompanied it have contributed to a further shift in auditors’ attitudes toward 
clients. This shift has also been codified in auditing standards as SAS No. 99, Consideration 
of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, 2003a), which was an anticipated evolution 
of SAS No. 82.
3
  As Katz (2003) notes, SAS No. 99 increases the level of skepticism with 
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 When SAS No. 82 went into effect, plans were immediately put in place to thoroughly review the standard with 
an eye towards improving it.  SAS No. 99 (AICPA, 2003a) reflects the outcome of that comprehensive review as 
well as the suggestions made by the Public Oversight Board’s Panel on Audit Effectiveness. 
 
which the auditor is to view the client, advising “auditors to be skeptical about their clients’ 
honesty” (see also AICPA 2003a, SAS No. 99, paragraph 13). 
Using the new mindset mandated by SAS No. 99, auditors are required to look for 
specific fraud risk factors in the course of the audit. Auditors should, therefore, be aware of 
the likely sources of fraud and their impact on the financial statements. 
Traditionally, two general classes of fraud have been identified: asset misappropriation 
and financial statement misstatement. While more common (KPMG, 2003), asset 
misappropriation is less of a concern to the auditors as long as the financial statements have 
been corrected to reflect the misappropriation of assets. In contrast, financial statement 
misstatement is less common, but accounts for the greatest dollar loss to shareholders 
(KPMG, 2003). Accordingly, auditors should be most attuned to the possibility of financial 
statement misstatement.  
Financial Statement Misstatement in the Pre-SOX Era 
Based upon a review of securities litigation and regulatory enforcement data for the 
period 1995-1999, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) identified the most frequent methods of 
perpetuating financial statement fraud (Hacker, 2002). The results of PwC’s analysis for this 
pre-SOX period are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 about here. 
As shown in Table 1, the most common method for perpetuating financial statement 
fraud in the pre-SOX era is in the area of revenue recognition. Examples of revenue 
recognition manipulative practices include: 
• Early recognition of revenue, via timing of shipments and title transfers;  
• Overestimation of percentage of completion judgments as to when the work is 
reasonably complete and whether the company can collect for services; and 
• Recording bogus sales involving actual shipment of goods that a customer never 
ordered or fake customers.  
The second most common method for perpetuating financial statement fraud is asset 
overstatement. Asset overstatement includes misuse of reserves and improper capitalization of 
expenses; overstatements of the value of inventory (e.g., by not writing down the value of 
obsolete goods); overstatement of property values; creation of fictitious assets; and 
understatement of allowances for receivables. 
As shown in Table 1, the third most common method for perpetuating financial statement 
fraud is understatement of liabilities, costs or expenses. Examples of manipulative practices 
involving the understatement of liabilities, costs or expenses include: 
• Off-balance sheet financing arrangements (e.g., operating leases, take-or-pay 
contracts, contingent liabilities); 
• The presence of guarantees and warranties; and 
• Subsidiary/affiliate/partnership dealings (e.g., Enron’s use of off-balance sheet 
Special Purpose Entities) 
Fourth, financial statement fraud is perpetuated by the use of improper accounting estimates.  
As a result of the uncertainties inherent in business activities, financial statement items cannot 
be measured with precision but can only be estimated. The estimation process involves 
judgments based on the latest available, reliable information. Estimates may be required, for 
example, of bad debts; inventory obsolescence; the fair value of financial assets; or the useful 
lives of, or expected pattern of consumption of the future economic benefits embodied in 
depreciable assets; or actuarial and investment return assumptions in accounting for pensions. 
Accounting estimates by their nature are easily subject to aggressive accounting practices and, 
therefore, are a means to manage earnings. The use of reasonable estimates is an essential part 
of the preparation of financial statements thus improper estimates undermines their reliability. 
Finally, as indicated in Table 1, fraud is perpetuated by improper accounting for 
business combinations or restructuring. Examples include: 
• “Big bath” restructuring charges that are perpetrated under the guise of 
corporate restructurings or mergers to avoid future charges related to normal 
operating cost; 
• “Merger magic” where a large percentage of the acquisition price is charged 
off because it is classified as in-process research and development to show 
improved future operating results; and 
• Liabilities for “potential exposures” in a business combination which can be 
improperly included in the business combination and taken into income in 
future periods 
Financial Statement Misstatement in the Post-SOX Era 
Based on the findings of prior research and given changes in the post-SOX auditing 
environment that now require auditors to adopt a heightened professional skepticism and, ex 
ante, assess the likelihood of fraud on their audits, it is worthwhile to investigate the 
frequency practitioners associate with aforementioned methods of financial statement 
misstatement. Using data applicable to the pre-SOX era from PricewaterhouseCoopers, we 
thus investigate the first research question: 
Research Question 1:  Of the five most common methods of perpetrating financial 
statement fraud in the pre-SOX era, which do practitioners believe is most prevalent in 
the post-SOX era? 
 
Auditors’ ethical perception and materiality 
Several studies find that auditors are more perceptive of ethical issues (e.g., financial 
statement misrepresentation) when the “moral intensity” (Jones, 1991) of the issue increases. 
According to Jones (1991) there are six characteristics, which together comprise the construct, 




Shafer and his colleagues (i.e., Ketchand, et al. 1999; Shafer, et al. 1999, 2001) 
perform three studies that investigate whether auditors increase their ethical perception when 
the materiality of the issue increases. In each of the studies, materiality was manipulated 
between high and low materiality. Not surprisingly, the authors find that auditors display 
greater ethical perception when the materiality of the issue is high. These findings suggest that 
an assessment of the expected materiality of financial statement misstatements in the post-
SOX period is also warranted as it likely associates with auditors’ perception of the causes of 
financial statement misstatements.  This leads to the second research question: 
Research Question 2: In the post-SOX era, what is the expected impact on the 
financial statements of each of the most common methods of perpetrating financial 
statement fraud? 
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 The other five characteristics are: the degree of social consensus; the probability that harm will occur; temporal 
immediacy; proximity of harm to the target; and the concentration of effect. 
APPROACH AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
  The data for this study were collected via subjects’ voluntary and anonymous 
responses to our Perception Survey (see Appendix A for a copy of the survey). During the 
spring of 2005, we distributed the survey to professionals employed in public accounting 
firms through Human Resource (HR) personnel in those firms. All of the Big Four accounting 
firms, as well as three additional national public accounting firms participated. We asked each 
HR representative to distribute the survey to members of the professional staff at different 
firm levels and practice areas thus providing the authors with survey responses from subjects 
with a variety of experiences. A total of 235 surveys, all of which were usable, were returned 
to the researchers. Descriptive information for the total sample appears in Table 2.  Overall, 
44.5% (55.5%) of respondents were female (male). Approximately 17% of respondents were 
partners/principals, 21% were managers/directors, 27% were supervisors/seniors and 35% 
were associates. Respondents were drawn from audit/assurance services (62.4%), tax (18.3%) 
and other functions (e.g., national office researcher/trainer, human resources/recruiter, etc) 
(19.2%). 
Table 2 about here. 
  
RESULTS 
Research Question 1 
RQ1 asked which of the five most common methods of perpetuating financial 
statement fraud in the pre-SOX era practitioners believe is most prevalent in the post-SOX 
era. Table 3 presents the results of the survey, which are useful in assessing Research 
Question 1. 
Table 3 about here. 
 
As shown in Table 3, and consistent with findings in Table 1 for the pre-SOX era, 
post-SOX, practitioners perceive revenue recognition as the most common method of 
perpetuating financial statement fraud. Similarly, in both periods, improper accounting for 
business combinations or restructuring is the fifth most common method of perpetuating 
financial statement misstatement. 
Among rankings 2-4, however, there are differences. First, Table 3 shows that in the 
post-SOX period, practitioners perceive improper accounting estimates as the second most 
common means of misstating financial statements. This is in contrast to the data in Table 1 for 
the pre-SOX era, in which improper accounting estimates is the fourth most common method 
of perpetuating financial statement fraud. 
Second, the data in Table 3 indicate that the method post-SOX practitioners perceive 
as third most common for perpetuating financial statement misstatement is asset 
overstatement. In the pre-SOX era, the data in Table 1 show that asset overstatement is the 
second most common method of perpetuating financial statement fraud. 
Finally, in our post-SOX data as presented in Table 3, understatement of liabilities, 
costs or expenses is the method practitioners perceive as fourth most common for 
perpetuating financial statement fraud. In the pre-SOX period, the data in Table 1 indicate that 
understatement of liabilities, costs or expenses is ranks third. 
The differences in findings for the frequency of the methods of misstating financial 
statements as observed in the pre-SOX period and perceived in the post-SOX period are 
summarized in Table 4. 
Table 4 about here. 
Research Question 2 
RQ 2 considered the amount of the expected impact on the financial statements of 
each of the most common methods of perpetrating financial statement fraud in the post-SOX 
era. Table 5 presents the results of the survey questions inquiring about the magnitude of the 
impact on financial statement misstatements of the various methods. The results presented in 
Table 5 are useful in assessing Research Question 2. 
Table 5 about here. 
 
As shown in Table 5 (Panel A), subjects’ most prevalent response for each method of 
financial statement misstatement coincides with their perceptions about the frequency of each 
of the methods of financial statement misstatement. That is, the most prevalent response for 
revenue recognition and improper accounting estimates, the most common and second most 
common method of financial statement misstatement, respectively, is that the methods have a 
greatly significant impact on financial statement misstatements (according to 41.0% of 
subjects for revenue recognition and 34.9% of subjects for improper accounting estimates). 
Asset overstatement and understatement of liabilities, costs or expenses, respectively, are the 
third and fourth most common methods of financial statement misstatements. The most 
prevalent responses for asset overstatement (given by 48.9% of subjects) and understatement 
of liabilities, costs or expenses (given by 29.3% of subjects), is that those methods result in a 
significant impact on financial statement misstatements. Finally, for improper accounting for 
business combinations and restructuring, there was a tie for most prevalent response. An equal 
number of subjects (i.e., 29.3%) indicated that improper accounting for business combinations 
and restructuring has either a moderately significant or a slightly significant impact on 
financial statements.  
Interestingly, however, as also shown in Panel A of Table 5, the percentage of subjects 
indicating that the use of asset overstatement or understatement of liabilities, costs or 
expenses in misstating financial statements has at least a greatly significant impact on 
financial statement misstatement does not precisely coincide with their perceptions about the 
frequency of the use of those methods. Although more respondents perceive asset 
overstatement more prevalent than understatement of liabilities, costs or expenses, more 
respondents (i.e., 21.8%) perceive at least a greatly significant impact of understatement of 
liabilities, costs or expenses and fewer respondents (i.e., 10.5%) perceive at least a greatly 
significant impact of asset overstatement.   
As shown in Table 5 (Panel B), when considering the cumulative percentage of 
respondents indicating that the impact of the various methods of misstatement on financial 
statement misstatements was at least significant, the results are unchanged from the results 
discussed above. That is, revenue recognition practices are first (with 80.3% of respondents 
indicating that they have at least a significant impact on financial statement misstatements), 
followed by improper accounting estimates (62.4%), asset overstatement (59.4%), 
understatement of liabilities, costs or expenses (51.1%), and improper accounting for business 
combinations and restructuring (22.2%). 
Interestingly, when considering the cumulative percentage of respondents indicating 
that the impact of the various methods of misstatement on financial statement misstatements 
was at least moderately significant, the results for revenue recognition (judged by 91.2% of 
respondents to have at least a moderately significant impact on financial statement 
misstatements) and improper accounting for business combinations and restructuring (judged 
by 52.5% of respondents to have at least a moderately significant impact on financial 
statements) remain unchanged in order at first and last, respectively. However, as shown in 
Table 5 (Panel B), the middle three categories re-order a bit. Some 86.0% of respondents 
indicated that the impact on financial statement misstatements of asset overstatement is at 
least moderately significant, followed by improper accounting estimates (with 80.7% of 
respondents indicating the impact is at least moderately significant), and understatement of 
liabilities, costs or expenses (with 76.0% of respondents indicating the impact is at least 
moderately significant). 
The differences in findings for the frequency of the methods of misstating financial 
statements as observed in the pre-SOX period and perceived in the post-SOX period are 
summarized in Table 6. When reviewed together, it is clear that subjects believe 
misstatements resulting from revenue recognition are the most material and those resulting 
from improper accounting for business combinations and restructuring the least material. 
Among the other three methods (i.e., improper accounting estimates, asset overstatement, and 
understatement of liabilities, costs or expenses), there is less agreement. Nonetheless, the 
trend, as borne out in Table 6, is for the materiality of improper accounting estimates, asset 
overstatement and understatement of liabilities, costs or expenses to coincide with their 
perceived frequencies at second, third and fourth, respectively. 
Table 6 about here. 
 
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA ANALYSIS 
Our main purpose was to see if there were changes in auditors’ perceptions about the 
causes and materiality of financial statement misrepresentation in the post-SOX era. We also 
collected data to gain insight into auditors’ perceptions about whether they believed SOX 
would reduce the number of financial statement misstatements. As shown in Table 7a, 41.9% 
indicated “yes” (coded as 1), that they believed SOX would reduce the number of financial 
statement misstatements; 4.4% were “undecided” (coded as 2) about the effect of SOX; and 
53.7% indicated “no” (coded as 3), that they did not believe SOX would reduce the number of 
financial statement misstatements. However, the data for our overall sample obscures 
interesting differences in the perceptions of the efficacy of SOX according to experience level 
(Table 7b), degree of education (Table 7c), and age of respondent (Table 7d). 
Tables 7a-7d about here. 
 
As shown in Table 7b, those under 25 years of age were much more likely than those 
over 25 years of age to indicate that they believed, “yes” that SOX would reduce the number 
of financial statement misstatements. Similarly, as shown in Table 7c, those at the associate 
level were more likely than those at higher levels of experience to indicate that they believed, 
“yes” that SOX would reduce the number of financial statement misstatements. Finally, as 
shown in Table 7d, those holding only bachelors degrees were more likely than those holding 
bachelors and advanced degrees to indicate that they believed, “yes” that SOX would reduce 
the number of financial statement misstatements. The data in Tables 7b-7d suggest that 
differences in maturity affect auditors’ skepticism about the efficacy of SOX. In particular, 
more mature professionals (i.e., those professional who are older, more experienced and more 
highly educated) are more skeptical than less mature professionals of the legislation’s ability 
to reduce financial statement misstatements. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
As pointed out above, findings of the study suggest that in the post-SOX period, 
practitioners perceive revenue recognition practices (business combination and restructuring 
practices) as the most common (fifth most common) method of financial statement 
misstatement. These findings are unchanged from the reported data for the pre-SOX period. 
We also find that of the five most commonly reported methods of perpetuating financial 
statement misstatement, revenue recognition practices (business combination and 
restructuring practices) are perceived as having at least a moderately significant impact on 
financial statement misstatements by the greatest (smallest) proportion of respondents. These 
findings suggest that in their preliminary consideration of fraud pursuant to the brainstorming 
session now required by SAS No. 99, auditors should most definitely be concerned about the 
possibility of financial statement misstatement due to revenue recognition practices (e.g., 
early recognition of revenue, overestimation of percentage of completion, recording of bogus 
sales). Financial statement misstatements due to improper accounting for business 
combinations and restructurings appear to be less of a threat in terms of the frequency and 
magnitude of the misstatements, but this may be because not all companies have business 
combinations or restructurings every year.  
Our findings for practitioners’ perception about the second, third and fourth most 
common methods of financial statement misstatement differ from those reported in the pre-
SOX period. It is possible that the differences are due to our limiting subject choice to one 
method of financial statement misstatement, while the pre-SOX data allowed for multiple 
responses (e.g., reporting an incidence of financial statement misstatement due to both 
revenue recognition practices and asset overstatement). Future research is needed to clarify 
the reason for the difference between the results from the pre-SOX period and our results for 
the post-SOX period. 
Nonetheless, when the perceived frequencies of the methods of financial statement 
misstatement are considered with the perceived materiality of the methods, it becomes clear 
that the two do, indeed, associate (c.f., Ketchand, et al 1999; Shafer, et al 1999, 2001). 
Further, in the post-SOX period, auditors should be concerned about improper accounting 
estimates, as a second to revenue recognition, in their preliminary consideration of fraud. 
Moreover, because SAS No. 99 (AICPA, 2003a) specifically includes procedures for 
reviewing accounting estimates for biases that could result in material misstatement due to 
fraud, auditors have further cause to pay close attention to the possibility of misstatement 
resulting form improper accounting estimates. 
The third spot, held by asset overstatement, is only slightly ahead of understatement of 
liabilities, costs or expenses. Accordingly, in auditors’ consideration of financial statement 
misrepresentation on their audits, both of these areas deserve auditor consideration as well. 
In general, auditors have long had a responsibility to uphold the public interest, putting 
their responsibilities to the public ahead of those to clients and employers (e.g., AICPA 2005 
at ET 53). In the past, audit clients were considered ethical and auditors were not specifically 
required to assess the likelihood of fraud on their audits. Over time, a number of audit failures 
have occurred, including some of the more notable ones, which are outlined in Table 8. 
Table 8 about here. 
More recently, and in response to audit failures, including the notable ones included in 
Table 8 (and, especially Enron), the public has sought for auditors to improve the usefulness 
of audited financial statements by assuring them of the lack of fraud. The Congress’ response 
– SOX – has resulted in, arguably, the most sweeping legislation to affect the audit profession 
since the Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934. 
Certainly, in the post-SOX world, the audit landscape is different than it was in the 
pre-SOX era. The “coziness” auditors once enjoyed with clients – such as by providing both 
audit and consulting services to clients or by serving as auditor for an extended period of time 
– is now legally forbidden. As a result, in the name of upholding the public interest, auditors 
have been called upon to view their clients skeptically. 
But, are they better equipped to do so? Our results find a shift from the pre- to post-
SOX era in auditors’ perception of the causes of financial statement misrepresentation, 
suggesting a change in auditors’ ethical perception in the post-SOX era. However, it is 
particularly telling that, as compared to less seasoned professionals, more seasoned 
professionals (i.e., those who are older, have more experience or more education) have 
significantly greater doubts about the ability of SOX to reduce the number of financial 
statement misstatements. Sadly, our results suggest that mature professionals concur with 
Young (2005). That is, they, too, doubt that “quick fixes”, such as the legislation promulgated 
in SOX, can adequately address the problems underlying financial statement 
misrepresentation. 
Thus, while professionals’ ethical perception differs in the post-SOX era, the efficacy 
of the legislation continues to be a concern. Young (2005) suggests that before undertaking a 
“shot gun” approach to reform, different questions need to be asked to assess the root causes 
of corporate scandals. Likewise, evidence from more seasoned professionals in our study 
suggests there is much merit in Young’s (2005) argument.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
As a survey, our results are prone to all of usual associated weaknesses. For example, 
our data captures information just at one point in time and fails to provide evidence indicative 
of causality. Because our data were drawn from convenience samples (with a concentration in 
the New York Metropolitan area), we cannot ensure that our findings are completely 
representative of a national cross-section of practitioners. To extend our results, future 
research might consider conducting a similar study using a national cross-section of 
practitioners drawn at random. Finally, we could not and thus did not assess the degree to 
which audit professionals’ perceptions in 2005 about the causes and materiality of financial 
statement misrepresentation correspond to actual financial statement misrepresentation 
uncovered in the future. Accordingly, future research should be undertaken to investigate the 
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Pre-SOX Reported Frequency of Methods of Financial Statement Misstatement 
Method of 
Financial Statement Misstatement 
% of Misstatements in 
Which Method Is Used* 
Revenue Recognition  55% 
Asset Overstatement 40% 
Understatement of Liabilities, Costs or Expenses 17% 
Improper Accounting Estimates 15% 
Improper Acctg for Bus’n Combinations or Restructuring 16% 
*Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers review of securities litigation and regulatory enforcement 
data for the period 1995-1999 (Hacker, 2002). Percentages do not sum to 100% because 
multiple responses were possible. 
 
Table 2 
Demographic Characteristics of Sample Responses –  
Big Four, National and Total Samples 




   Partner/Principal 
   Manager/Director 
   Supervisor/Senior 
   Associate 
      Total 
 
 
38 (  16.6%) 
49 (  21.4%) 
62 (  27.1%) 
80 (  34.9%) 
229 (100.0%) 
Area of Specialty 
   Audit/Assurance 
   Tax 
   Non-audit/Non-tax 
      Total 
 
 
143 (  62.4%) 
42 (  18.3%) 
44 (    19.2%) 
229 (100.0%) 
Gender 
   Females 
   Males 
      Total 
 
 
102  (  44.5%) 
127  (  55.5%) 
229  (100.0%) 
Table 3 
Post-SOX Perceived Frequency of Methods of Financial Statement Misstatement 
Method of 
Financial Statement Misstatement 
Number (%) 
Of Responses 
Revenue Recognition    
 
   88 (   38.4%) 
Improper Accounting Estimates    
 
   78 (   34.1%) 
Asset Overstatement 
 
   32 (   14.0%) 
Understatement of Liabilities, Costs or Expenses    
 
   22 (     9.6%) 
Improper Accounting for Business Combinations or Restructuring 
 
      9 (     3.9%) 
Total 
 




Perceived Frequency of Methods of Financial Statement Misstatement: 
Pre- vs. Post-SOX Periods 
Method of 





Revenue Recognition    
 
1 1 






Understatement of Liabilities, Costs or Expenses    
 
3 4 




*1=Most frequent; 5=Least frequent 
 
Table 5 

























































24(10.5%) 112 (48.9%) 61 (26.6%) 29 (12.7%) 3 (1.3%) 
Understatement 
of Liability, 




























Note: Most prevalent response for each method of financial statement misstatement bolded. 
Table 5 











































































































Note: Cumulative responses for at least a significant impact (i.e., >5% misstatement) have 
been bolded. 
Table 6 
Perceived Materiality of Methods of Financial Statement Misstatement: 














Rank by % 
indicating at 




Rank by % 
indicating 
at least a 
significant 
impact* 
Rank by % 
indicating 






1 1 1 1 
Improper Acctg 
Estimates    
2 2 2 3 
Asset 
Overstatement 
3 4 3 2 
Understatement of 
Liabs, Costs or Exps    
4 3 4 4 
Improper Acctg for 
Bus’n Combos or 
Restructuring 
5 5 5 5 
*1=Most material; 5=Least material 
Table 7 
Perception of Whether SOX Will Reduce the Number of Financial Statement Misstatements 
 
  
Responses to query: In your perception to you believe that 





















<25 62 (74.7%) 10 (12.0%) 11 (13.3%) 83 (100.0%) 
25-29 12 (20.0%)   0 (  0.0%) 48 (80.0%) 60 (100.0%) 
30-34 10 (25.0%)   0 (  0.0%) 30 (75.0%) 40 (100.0%) 





Associate 61 (76.3%) 10 (12.5%)   9 (11.3%) 80 (100.0%) 
Supervisor/ 
Senior Associate 
15 (24.2%)   0 (  0.0%) 47 (75.8%) 62 (100.0%) 
Manager/ 
Director 
  9 (18.4%)   0 (  0.0%) 40 (81.6%) 49 (100.0%) 








77 (52.4%)   8 (  5.4%) 62 (42.2%) 147 (100.0%) 
Graduate Degree 19 (23.2%)   2 (  2.4%) 61 (74.4%) 82 (100.0%) 
 
Note: Most prevalent response for each sub-sample bolded. 
 
Table 8 
Well-Known Ethical Scandals*  
 
*The recent scandals included here are those set forth in Coyne, et al (2005). 










Revenue Recognition (Wrongly revenue in 1998 and 
1999 fiscal years, in order to artificially inflate the 
stock price) 
2000 Xerox Revenue Recognition (Improper revenue recognition 
on leases) 
2001 Enron Understatement of Liabilities, Costs or Expenses 




Revenue Recognition (Inflated revenue April 1999 to 
the end of 2001) 
2002 Adelphia Revenue Recognition ( Improperly recognized cable 
television subscribers as income) 
2002 AOL/Time 
Warner 
Revenue Recognition (Improper revenue recognition 
on “round trip” advertising transactions) 
Improper Acctg for Business Combos/Restructurings 
(Failure to properly consolidate subsidiary) 
2002 Bristol-Myers-
Squibb 
Revenue Recognition (Channel stuffing)  
2002 Global Crossing Revenue Recognition (Accelerated recording of 
revenues on long-term contracts) 
2002 Halliburton Revenue Recognition (Undisclosed, income 
increasing change in revenue recognition policy) 
2002 Healthsouth Improper Accounting Estimates (Understatement of 
Allowance for Doubtful Accounts) 
2002 Kmart Asset Overstatement (Lack of truthful disclosure 
about the true reason for increase in inventory – i.e., 
over-buying by management) 
2002 Merck Revenue Recognition (Improper revenue recognition 
of co-payments received by subsidiary, Medco) 
2002 Qwest 
Communications 
Revenue Recognition (Overstatement of revenue on 
swaps) 
2002 Worldcom Understatement of Liabilities, Costs or Expenses 
(Improper capitalization of expenses) 
2003 Parmalat SPA Improper Acctg for Business Combos/Restructurings 
(Failure to properly consolidate subsidiary in the 
Cayman Islands called Bonlat) 
31 
QUICK LITTLE SURVEY ~ Please Highlight or Circle Your Response  
 
1} In your perception which of the following would you consider to be the greatest contributor to 
financial statement misstatements: 
a) Revenue Recognition 
b) Asset Overstatement 
c) Liability and Costs OR Expenses Understatement 
d) Improper Accounting Estimates 
e) Business Combinations and Restructuring 
 
Kindly respond the next five questions using the following guide: 
Insignificant = < 1%   |    Slightly Significant = >1% to < 3%     
     Moderately Significant = >3% to <5% 
Significant = >5% to <10%   |   Very Significant = >10% 
 
2} Revenue Recognition practices have a ____________ impact on financial statement misstatements. 
a) Insignificant 
b) Slightly Significant 
c) Moderately Significant 
d) Significant 
e) Very Significant 
      
3} Asset Overstatement practices have a __________   impact on financial statement misstatements. 
a) Insignificant 
b) Slightly Significant 
c) Moderately Significant 
d) Significant 
e) Very Significant 
 
4} Liability/Costs or Expense Understatement practices have a  ___________ impact on financial 
statement misstatements. 
a) Insignificant 
b) Slightly Significant 
c) Moderately Significant 
d) Significant 
e) Very Significant 
    
5} Improper Accounting Estimate practices have a __________ impact on financial statement 
misstatements. 
a) Insignificant 
b) Slightly Significant 
c) Moderately Significant 
d) Significant 
e) Very Significant 
 
6} Business Combination & Restructuring practices have a _________ impact on financial statement 
misstatements. 
a) Insignificant 
b) Slightly Significant 
c) Moderately Significant 
d) Significant 










2. You are a …   ? 
a. Partner/Principal 
b. Manager/Director  
c. Supervisor/Senior Associate 
d. Associate 
e. College student/intern 
 
3. You are practicing in which department?  
a. Assurance/Audit 
b. Tax 
c. Internal/Non public position  
c. Other 
 
4. Your education level – please circle all that apply: (students should not circle any choices) 
 a. BS 
 b. MS 
 c. MBA 
 d. PhD 
 e. JD 
 f. LLM 
 
5. What is your Age Group? 
 a. 19 – 24 
 b. 25 – 29 
 c. 30 – 34 
 d. 35 – 39 
 e. 40 – 44 
 f. 44 – 49 
 g. 50 + 
 
6. What professional certifications or licenses do you hold - please circle all that apply: (students 
should not circle any choices) 
 a. CPA 
 b. CMA 
 c. CFA 
 d. CIA 
 e. Other(s) ___________________________________________ 
 
7. In your perception, do you believe that Sarbanes-Oxley will reduce the number of financial 
statement misstatements? 
 a. Yes 
 b. No 
 c. Undecided 
 
